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Abstract  
 
The Leizhou Peninsula in western Guangdong (concurrent with the present-day municipality of 
Zhanjiang) has at several points in history been an important site of exchange, both licit and 
illicit in the eyes of central authorities. The French gained control of the area from the weakened 
Qing government in 1898–1899 and established their “leased territory” of Guangzhouwan. 
Administered as part of French Indochina, Guangzhouwan became a fiefdom of smugglers, 
pimps, and pirates, never developing into the rival to Hong Kong that the French hoped it would 
become. After a brief Japanese occupation, the French returned the leased territory to the 
government of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) after World War II, but their colonial presence left 
a legacy of trafficking, violence, and anti-imperialism that emboldened Communist guerrillas in 
the area. Once the Communists came into power in 1949, they subjected Zhanjiang and other 
liminal spaces along the Chinese coast to vigorous anti-smuggling and anti-drug campaigns. But 
a return to smuggling in the Reform Era (1978–present) suggests that the successful repression of 
smuggling in the Mao era may have been a temporary exception to the historical rule in this 
region. 
 
Keywords: French imperialism, French Indochina, opium, smuggling, China, People’s Republic, 
Guangzhouwan, Zhanjiang, Reform Era, anti-corruption 
 
Introduction 
The prefecture-level municipality of Zhanjiang 湛江市 (figure 1), encompassing the Leizhou 
Peninsula 雷州半島 in the western part of China’s Guangdong Province, is a product of post–
World War II administrative reforms put in place by the Nationalist government and carried over 
in the People’s Republic after 1949. Zhanjiang is an amalgamation of several counties and cities, 
including ports with long histories as centers for distant trade, and the region was a prominent 
part of the Maritime Silk Road. The Leizhou Peninsula’s coasts lie in the middle of a maritime 
zone stretching from the Pearl River Delta to Haiphong in the Red River Delta, while, on land, 
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the peninsula has served as a gateway leading from Guangdong to Guangxi, Yunnan, and Tonkin. 
A central event in the history of the Leizhou Peninsula was the creation of the French-leased 
territory of Guangzhouwan in 1899 and the subsequent arrival of French military forces and 
colonial officials. The creation of this zone beyond the control of the Qing government offered 
tremendous opportunities for traders—particularly opium traders—as well as an administrative 
nightmare for Chinese officials. These frustrations carried over into and through the Republican 
period, despite earnest government efforts to rein in smuggling operations. The trafficking of 
goods, narcotics, and people outside of official channels diminished only after intense political 
campaigns under the Communists in the course of the 1950s. Indeed, smuggling and 
unauthorized migration were only partially suppressed in the Maoist period (1949–1976) of the 
People’s Republic, and they have returned as a perennial source of aggravation for government 
officials since 1978, as China’s economy has expanded.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Map showing the location of modern Zhanjiang and the Leizhou Peninsula relative to 
nearby major cities. Source: Google Earth. 
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 It would be easy to interpret the twentieth-century history of Guangzhouwan in terms of 
imperialist expansion and anti-imperialist reaction, or through a framework of laissez-faire 
versus socialist economic systems. But it makes more sense to assess the history of the Leizhou 
Peninsula at several temporal and geographical scales, revealing instead the mostly unsuccessful 
state efforts to control the movement of goods and people. Across the course of the twentieth 
century and into the twenty-first, we can see the expanding capacities of the state to govern the 
traffic of goods and people according to its own preferences. Just as obvious, however, is the 
stubborn adherence of people to their instincts for survival and profit, as well as an unending 
capacity for creativity in circumventing state barriers and restrictions, including the enlistment of 
state agents at the local level to undermine higher-level imperatives. 
 
French Interests and Imperialism in the Late Qing Period 
The impetus for trade in the Leizhou region persisted for centuries, outlasting numerous 
dynasties and imperial powers. The region was already an important location for trade in the Han 
dynasty, becoming a key stop on the sea lanes of the Maritime Silk Road as well as a host for 
piracy.1 Unsurprisingly, piracy was particularly acute in periods when centralized political power 
was weak, such as the late Qianlong and Jiaqing periods, when it was driven by the same 
pressures that provoked a number of rebellions throughout the Qing realm (Wang 2014, 81–82). 
Pirates grew from occasional raiders to full-time, large-scale organizations operating along the 
coasts of northern Vietnam, Guangxi, and Guangdong, using the Leizhou Peninsula as a base and 
later affiliating with the Tayson Rebellion in Vietnam (Antony 2003, 38–39, 43). Later advocates 
of French imperialism seeking to justify the need for French control of the region could point to 
“rampant” opium smuggling and “intense” piracy that “spread terror all along the coast, from 
Ha-Long Bay to Macao” (Bonningue 1931, 38; Matot 2013, 57), including attacks on Western 
trading vessels transiting to or from Canton (Antony 2003, 45).  
At the same time that Qing officials were trying to rein in piracy, Nguyễn Phúc Ánh 
(enthroned as Gia Long) marched north in 1802 with the help of a French Catholic missionary, 
defeated enemy Tayson forces, and united Vietnam under a single dynasty (Ricklefs et al. 2010, 
145–146). Nevertheless, his successors took a more aggressive stance toward French 
missionaries and their sizable population of converts, just as France was seeking to expand its 
imperial activities in East Asia following the ascension of Napoleon III. First in 1858, and then 
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in 1867, French naval expeditions were sent to Vietnam, ostensibly to protect missionaries but in 
reality to establish a definitive French presence at the mouth of the Mekong River, using it as a 
springboard for further influence in the region—namely, access to the markets of southern China 
(Ricklefs et al. 2010, 181). France had already secured substantial rights in China following the 
First and Second Opium Wars, but the French presence in the treaty ports remained minor and 
French influence in China was channeled mainly through the Catholic missions, impelling hopes 
that greater economic influence in China could be gained through Tonkin (Lee 1989, 3–4). But 
imperial adventurism in northern Vietnam brought France into direct conflict with the Qing, 
leading ultimately to France declaring a protectorate in Tonkin and the Sino-French War of 
1884–1885. Control over Tonkin was gained, but the war against the Qing was an unpopular 
stalemate and led to the fall of the pro-colonial Ferry government, impairing the prospects of a 
more robust French influence in China’s southern provinces (Cady 1954, 293–294). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Map showing approximate boundaries of the Guangzhouwan leased territory. Source: 
Google Earth, amended by author. 
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Figure 3. Map showing the approximate boundaries of and places within the French Leased 
Territory. Source: Google Earth, amended by the author. 
 
Building Guangzhouwan 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Leizhou region began a political, social, and 
economic transformation that would define it for the next fifty years and beyond. Centered on the 
towns of Chikan 赤坎 and Xiying 西營, a French-leased territory was established that would 
become known, in short order, as a failed imperial project (see figures 2 and 3). Like the French 
concessions in major Chinese ports, there was ultimately little that was French about the newly 
leased territory of Guangzhouwan. The French population of Guangzhouwan never exceeded 
three hundred, and the territory remained essentially Chinese; even the French administration 
was primarily composed of Chinese and Vietnamese functionaries (Bonningue 1931, 2).2 
However, a failed imperial project can be “successful” in some respects. Guangzhouwan was 
born at the height of the contest of empires and, like most colonial possessions in East Asia, died 
as a result of World War II. Despite its brief tenure as a French outpost, yet essentially a Chinese 
territory, Guangzhouwan is representative of the longue durée of the history of China’s southern 
coast. At the level of moyenne durée and l’histoire événementielle, Guangzhouwan was 
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important as a conduit for people, goods, money, and ideas, and it also played an outsized role in 
the redemptive nationalist projects of both the Guomindang (GMD, also known as the 
Nationalists) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
Seeking a French Hong Kong, the architects of French Indochina, including Paul Doumer, 
governor-general of Indochina from 1897 to 1902, scrutinized the southern Chinese coast for an 
appropriate location. Due to Chinese and British opposition, Hainan Island was not an option, 
nor were established ports like Beihai; an alternative had to be found. French commercial ships 
had first arrived in the region at the turn of the eighteenth century. In 1701, the second of these 
voyages to China was caught in a typhoon and ran aground off Nansan in Wuchuan County 吳川
縣 and stayed for six months before leaving. Nearly two centuries later, ambitious supporters of 
French colonization would point to the temporarily marooned ship, as well as notes made by its 
crew, to justify their focus on the region as the possible site of a leased territory in China (Matot 
2013, 26).3 In March 1898, the French government formally presented to the Qing a proposal for 
leasing territory in southern China; by the end of the month, a 20 square-kilometer area was 
carved out of Nansan for a naval station and a coaling station (Bonningue 1931, 9). In late April, 
the first contingent of about two hundred French marines arrived and established themselves in a 
derelict Qing coastal fort, which they renamed Fort Bayard, with the expectation that it would 
serve as “one of the principal entrepôts in the Far East” (Matot 2013, 51).4 
 The French marines quickly moved inland into Suixi and Wuchuan from the former Qing 
fort and immediately engaged in fighting with locals. As was the case in other parts of China at 
the turn of the century, secret societies opposed to both foreign imperialism and Qing rule were 
active in Leizhou. Local gentry began organizing armed opposition against French troops, setting 
off a struggle that lasted more than a year and resulted in the deaths of dozens of Chinese fighters 
and civilians, including the wholesale destruction and slaughter of the village of Vong-Luock 
(Huanglüe 黃略) by French troops (Matot 2013, 28–29, 32, 35–39; Long and Jing 2013, 33; Su 
2004, 222; Zeng 1999, 25–26). Buttressed by reinforcements and feeling confident in their 
position at Guangzhouwan, the French sought to press their advantage and use the armed 
opposition as a pretext for demanding greater concessions. After months of wrangling, on 
November 16, 1899, the French and Qing signed the “Guangzhouwan Leased Territory Treaty” 
(廣州灣租界條約), resulting in a ninety-nine-year lease on a greatly expanded territory (518 
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square kilometers of land and 2,130 square kilometers of sea) containing nearly 1,000 villages 
populated by 175,000 residents (see figure 2). Across from the old Qing fort at the inlet of the 
bay’s estuary (also known as the Maxie River 麻斜河), Vietnamese workers were brought in to 
build administrative structures and villas for French officials and military officers. The colonial 
structures on either side of the estuary would form the administrative basis of the territory until 
its dissolution in 1946; this political “capital” straddling the estuary at Xiying and Potou stood in 
contrast to the more heavily populated “commercial capital” of Chikan farther north. The leased 
territory was placed within the administrative structure and economic sphere of Indochine, with 
its administrators appointed by and responsible to Hanoi. 
 
Contestation and Control 
 Open rebellion against the French presence had been defeated, but residual opposition 
remained just below the surface. Two days after the treaty was signed, a local official in Chikan 
who had acceded to the treaty’s terms was assassinated (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1900, 
1–2; Ruan 1982, 72–79; Matot 2013, 44). For several years, French visitors to the new leased 
territory noted with alarm the animosity of the Chinese population. Political violence was so 
severe that mandarins suspected of collaborating with the French were almost entirely killed off 
by assassins by 1905. In early October 1904, more than a thousand bandits raided the town of 
Taiping, just within the leased territory’s southern boundary, and nearly destroyed it. In 
retaliation, the French summarily executed those in Taiping accused of colluding with the 
bandits and forced the town’s entire population to relocate (“Trouble” 1904). When the violence 
led to a near-complete stop in the lucrative opium trade in 1904, the administrator-assistant of 
Guangzhouwan, Henri Liégeot, launched a punitive expedition, killing six local notables 
suspected of involvement in the assassinations. The following summer, there were arson attacks 
on the European villas in Chikan, and nine children were abducted and held for ransom. Soon 
afterward, the gérant de l’intendance militaire and his wife were attacked and killed in a botched 
robbery of their villa. In reaction, Liégeot arrested three hundred locals, personally interrogating 
and torturing them; the prisoners were soon dying from malnourishment and violence. When his 
actions were uncovered by a French journalist, Liégeot was relieved from his post and replaced 
by a more level-headed and experienced colonial administrator (Ruan 1982, 72–75). 
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Despite political control emanating from Hanoi, and contrary to its raison d’être as a 
French rival to Hong Kong, Guangzhouwan became far more closely connected with markets in 
Hong Kong and Macao than those in Haiphong and Hanoi. In fact, Doumer’s replacement as 
governor-general, Paul Beau, actively sought out Chinese capitalists in Hong Kong who would 
be interested in incorporating Guangzhouwan into their networks. By the 1920s, the connection 
was so complete that, in most years, 95 percent or more of Guangzhouwan’s imports were from 
Hong Kong or Canton, and 98 percent or more of its exports were to Canton and Hong Kong. 
This connection with the Pearl River Delta was exacerbated by the fact that, while taxes and fees 
were collected in Indochinese piasters, the common currencies of exchange in Guangzhouwan 
were Chinese or Hong Kong silver dollars. Commercial exchange with the leased territory also 
was taxed as if it were a foreign territory, as opposed to a member of the Indochinese Union, so 
that it was often cheaper to import products from China than from Indochine (Vannière 2004, 
395). The centrality of Hong Kong to Guangzhouwan’s economy only increased as the two 
territories became solitary outposts that were partially insulated from the Sino-Japanese conflict 
raging around them in the late 1930s. Between 1938 and 1939, Guangzhouwan’s exports to 
Hong Kong (by value) nearly tripled, and imports from Hong Kong more than doubled.5 
A common feature of the territory’s connections to both Indochina and the Pearl River 
Delta was opium trafficking. The French colonial regime promoted and participated in opium 
production, which came to constitute as much as 30 percent of Indochine’s revenues from the 
1860s through the 1880s. Opium production and trafficking was handled by rival Cantonese and 
Hokkienese gongsi 公司 (social organizations of compatriots from the same region, often with 
lineage ties) who employed migrant Chinese laborers, and gongsi control of the market 
continued even after the French colonial authorities tried to establish a state monopoly in the 
1880s (Trocki 2007, 94–95). The opium that arrived in the leased territory was meant to be 
subject to a system of customs and rules (Douanes et Régies); in reality, though, these were 
difficult to enforce, and once registered opium entered the boundaries of the leased territory, it 
quickly intermingled with unregistered product (often being transformed from raw opium into 
chandoo, a form that could be smoked, in the process). By the time the opium was exported, the 
two were indistinguishable. A portion of the opium that arrived at Guangzhouwan was consumed 
locally (by 1930, opium users constituted roughly 30 percent of Guangzhouwan’s population), 
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but most (roughly two-thirds of the registered opium, and probably a higher proportion of 
smuggled opium) ended up in Hong Kong, and from there was often re-exported to Macao, the 
Chinese interior, or even the United States.6 In the aboveground opium market, raw opium and 
chandoo coming from Guangzhouwan were in competition with opium from other sources; 
however, the lax enforcement of customs and the porous borders of the leased territory meant 
that Guangzhouwan dominated the illicit opium market. In 1935, even after the Chinese 
government had begun to ring the territory with customs stations, 85 percent of contraband 
opium seized in Hong Kong came from Guangzhouwan (Vannière 2004, 508). 
These activities were encouraged, and even orchestrated, by French officials for the 
purpose of covering the territory’s military and administrative costs (He 2013, 165–166). The 
French had instituted a “head tax” (impôt de capitation) and property tax (impôt foncier) to raise 
revenue, but more lucrative were the taxes and fees collected on gambling, prostitution, and 
opium. The opium trade alone generally provided Guangzhouwan with half or more of its annual 
revenue. By the mid-1920s, fully one-third of the entire opium market in Indochine belonged to 
the leased territory (Vannière 2004, 654). But, in spite of these revenues, the money earmarked 
for the leased territory was minimal; consequently, Guangzhouwan required “extraordinary” 
annual subventions from Hanoi. Nevertheless, even with these subventions factored in, the 
leased territory was a significant net gain for the budget of Indochine in most years (Matot 2013, 
134). 
Despite the overlay of French colonial administration and military control, 
Guangzhouwan was a Chinese city in virtually every aspect. Even the police, the garde indigène, 
was composed of ethnic Chinese from Annam and Tonkin. The French also relied heavily on the 
kong-koc (公局 gongju), councils of local notables who were granted special trading privileges 
and control over the administration of taxes on gambling and prostitution (Matot 2013, 46). The 
few successful foreign merchants who did operate in Guangzhouwan were more often Japanese, 
German, or English than French, and attempts to champion French entrepreneurs failed (Matot 
2013, 91). Aside from civil and military officials, France was represented in its leased territory 
by a branch of the Banque de l’Indochine, the primary purpose of which became the housing of 
money gained from the opium trade. Most governors-general of Indochine, particularly after the 
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first decade of the twentieth century, were content to leave Guangzhouwan to its own devices so 
long as it returned budget surpluses (Matot 2013, 139).  
The real bosses of Guangzhouwan were, from its inception until its dissolution, the 
Chinese opium merchants who were connected to wider networks in Hong Kong and Macao, and 
throughout southern China. These merchants would form the leadership of the kong-koc and a 
later “indigenous consultative conference,” established to manage tax collection and public 
works. They also directly or indirectly managed most of the brothels, opium dens, gambling 
houses, and clubs in Chikan, and invested heavily in real estate, further propelling 
Guangzhouwan toward a highly stratified service and “rentier” economy that lacked industry or 
significant agricultural output. Among the Chinese elites of Guangzhouwan, unquestionably the 
most influential and important was Tsang Hoc-Tam (Chen Xuetan 陳學談), who acted as a 
mercenary, enforcer, and intermediary to the Chinese community, including the secret societies, 
bandits, and pirates (Matot 2013, 124–125). While his early life and circumstances are somewhat 
murky, there is consensus that Tsang was able to become the chief of the milice indigène in the 
market at Haitou 海頭 in 1910–1911 and used this position to enrich himself through the opium 
trade. He also helped the French in their struggle against bandits and became one of their most 
trusted intermediaries. Already by 1914–1915, he had amassed a personal fortune of 40,000 
piasters and was one of the largest real estate holders in the Chinese community. His career took 
off in 1914, when the French named Tsang the “chief pacifier and chief of commercial police” 
and allowed him to develop a private army to police the opium trade and attack his rivals in the 
process (Vannière 2004, 466). In 1916, he was made the chief of the local kong-koc in Chikan—
a post he held until the territory was dissolved at the end of World War II—and, in 1922, the 
subprefect of Suixi. With other administrative posts held by allies and relatives throughout the 
Leizhou Peninsula, Tsang was able to control the access points in and out of the leased territory. 
The French administrators in Guangzhouwan, cognizant of their own limitations and most 
concerned with preventing social disorder, banditry, and rebellion, developed a close personal 
relationship with Tsang and allowed him to manage Chikan, and indeed much of the leased 
territory, as a sort of viceroy (Vannière 2004, 468–469). On the rare occasion when a French 
official, unaware of the arrangement, raided Tsang’s warehouses to seize contraband, the chief 
administrator and higher authorities in Hanoi stepped in to return the goods, with an apology 
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(Vannière 2004, 470, 509). This was the sort of tactic that the French had employed in their 
concession in Shanghai—the “pact with the devil” with opium smuggler and mobster Du 
Yuesheng 杜月笙 (Martin 1996, ch. 5). It also bore resemblance to the deals that the Ming had 
made with powerful operators on the south China coasts whom they were unable to subdue. 
As had been the case before the French arrived, the Leizhou region continued to be 
plagued by piracy and banditry throughout the period of French rule. Pirates operating in the 
Gulf of Tonkin and along the shores of Leizhou frequently raided coastal villages and robbed 
fishing and commercial vessels, charged them a fee for passing through their territory, or 
kidnapped their crews for ransom. However, piracy was also the principal occupation of many in 
these same coastal communities, and local pirate chiefs tried to enlist traders as often as they 
stole from them. Pirates and brigands were also often in league with local secret societies 
committed to the overthrow of the Qing and expulsion of foreign imperialists. In response, both 
the Qing and French authorities launched continuous retaliatory raids along the Leizhou coast 
and nearby islands that housed pirates (Matot 2013, 57–58). An ambitious program of maritime 
expeditions, raids on opium dens, and organization of local militias helped to reduce piracy in 
the waters of the leased territory, but the issue continued to vex both French and Chinese 
administrations into the mid-twentieth century (Matot 2013, 78–79). During a particularly 
violent period in the early 1920s, By-Xa and By-Poui, rival pirates affiliated with opposing 
warlords and political factions in Guangdong, fought for primacy in the region. The combat was 
so relentless that, by 1924, the French estimated that some 90 percent of the villages in Leizhou 
had been destroyed. In seeking to contain piracy and land-based banditry, the French copied the 
Chinese state’s historical tactic of pitting bandits against each other and granting clemency to 
whichever side crushed the other. Yet the violence was only mitigated in 1925–1926, when 
troops of the National Revolutionary Army entered the Leizhou Peninsula (Vannière 2004, 463). 
The leased territory also posed an administrative nightmare for the dedicated officials of 
the Maritime Customs Service, based locally at Beihai. Regarding tariffs and taxes, no 
framework had been agreed on between the French and the Qing when the leased territory was 
established (Vannière 2004, 483). In 1903, the Beihai Customs Office indicated that goods 
entering or leaving the leased territory were not subject to duties, but as the quantities of opium 
entering China from Guangzhouwan increased, the Qing built customs posts near the leased 
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territory at Gaozhou and Leizhou and tried to control the movement of Chinese vessels in the 
vicinity. These efforts led to creative measures by smugglers to hide their products, including 
flying French or Portuguese flags to avoid harassment, disguising opium as kerosene, and 
developing an intimate knowledge of the Leizhou coast, using difficult-to-navigate inlets and 
bays as smuggling posts (Tan 1990, 96–98). Customs officials tried to construct additional 
customs checkpoints on the boundary of Guangzhouwan in the final years of Qing rule, but these 
were abolished by the Beiyang government in 1914. They made little difference anyhow, given 
the ease with which the boundary of the territory could be crossed and the financial incentives of 
the opium trade; thus, smuggling continued unabated (Matot 2013, 89). 
 
The End of Guangzhouwan 
 As the conflicts with anti-foreign secret societies and pirates in the first years of 
Guangzhouwan’s existence showed, the territory was not isolated from wider political 
developments. The French were concerned not only about pirates and armed gangs, but also 
about the anti-imperialism of Chinese nationalists (Matot 2013, 97). Both the GMD and CCP had 
connections in Guangzhouwan by the mid-1920s, including with the Vietnamese population. In 
May 1926, the tense situation produced a misunderstanding that resulted in French troops firing 
on and killing dozens of injured Chinese Nationalist troops (Matot 2013, 138–140). The same 
summer, the first local group of the CCP was established in the leased territory, where it quickly 
built contacts in the villages among the peasants and fishermen upset by taxes imposed by the 
French (Zhonggong zhanjiang 1994, 4). In subsequent years, social disorder in the countryside 
within and around the leased territory worsened as the French administration, primarily 
interested in maintaining the fiscal buoyancy of Guangzhouwan, raised taxes and licensing fees, 
thereby further incentivizing illicit trade and upsetting already hard-pressed peasants in the 
countryside (Vannière 2004, 500).  
 More ominous, however, was the successful establishment of a new national government 
at Nanjing in 1927–1928. By 1931, the Nanjing government had already launched an aggressive 
effort to control trade in and out of Guangzhouwan by setting up the Guangzhouwan Border 
Affairs Office 廣州灣邊區辦事處, part of a larger push to assert control over China’s borders 
and customs system. With the Chinese state having reestablished autonomy over the setting of 
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customs dues in 1928, yet still constrained in its ability to collect other sources of revenue, tariffs 
“soon represented the largest and most dependable source of central government income, 
averaging roughly half of annual revenues throughout the Nanjing decade” (Thai 2016, 81). Both 
tariff rates and the policing of commerce increased dramatically, leading to a greater intervention 
of the state into local economies and an increase in prices on imported goods. These measures 
also unintentionally increased the profitability of smuggling, making it an appealing profession 
for overtaxed peasants (Thai 2016, 82–83). Nanjing’s response to these problems was to push 
even harder for legal and administrative reforms that increased penalties on smuggling, but these 
efforts ran into stiff opposition from local communities and officials who had become 
accustomed to a weak central government (Thai 2016, 86–89). 
The Nanjing government’s commitment to fight smuggling and assert its sovereignty was 
tied to a similarly ardent commitment to eliminate extraterritorial privileges in China. The 
foreign concessions and leased territories on Chinese soil not only were a painful reminder of 
China’s weakness but also severely limited the central government’s ability to collect revenue 
and suppress smuggling (Thai 2016, 91–92). Regarding Guangzhouwan specifically, in lieu of 
the immediate retrocession of the leased territory to Chinese sovereignty, Nanjing hoped to raise 
the cost of doing business to a level that the French would find unacceptable. By the mid-1930s, 
Guangzhouwan was encircled by some twenty customs stations, branch offices, and checkpoints, 
including a post at Mazhang, less than a mile from Chikan (figure 4).7 Some 350 customs agents 
worked full time to create a cordon of surveillance around the leased territory. The Nanjing 
government also expanded anti-smuggling naval operations in southern China, stationed four 
warships to police the waters near Guangzhouwan, and completed detailed maps of the Leizhou 
coast, including the most commonly used smuggling inlets. While Chinese customs officials and 
police had limited control over what happened within the borders of the leased territory, greater 
documentation and surveillance along its boundaries allowed them, for example, to catch 
discrepancies between ships’ manifests and cargo after having docked at Guangzhouwan (Thai 
2016, 102). The effects of these measures were felt immediately, with Hong Kong reporting a 
dramatic drop in illicit opium coming from Guangzhouwan, and together with the effects of the 
Great Depression severely dampened the territory’s economy, with external commerce being 
halved between 1926 and 1933 (Vannière 2004, 485–486, 488). 
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Figure 4. Map showing the location of customs stations, branch offices, and checkpoints,            
c. 1936.8 Source: Google Earth, amended by author. 
 
Nonetheless, smuggling activity continued as traders devised new means of avoiding 
Chinese customs (Tan 1990, 100). Aside from opium, daily necessities such as sugar, kerosene, 
and cotton cloth were also smuggled across the boundaries and in the waters around 
Guangzhouwan, particularly during the poor economic situation of the 1930s. In the mid-1930s, 
overburdened customs officials working against the combined forces of smuggling, banditry, 
piracy, and organized crime were involved in multiple armed confrontations with villagers and 
criminal outfits operating along the periphery of Guangzhouwan. More routinely, a “spy network” 
employed by the smugglers used a system of signal lights and firecrackers to warn of the 
advance of customs officers out on night patrols or raids. 9  Even when smugglers were 
apprehended by customs agents, local authorities were often reluctant to deal with them, and the 
penalties imposed were lenient and inconsistent. Most smugglers who were caught in the act 
were low-level, irregular, and easily replaceable members in larger networks who were unable to 
pay the requisite fines for their crime, so that punishing them was a drain on the state’s time and 
resources that did nothing to stem the flow of smuggled goods (Thai 2016, 106–107). Smugglers 
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could also use the jurisdictional complexities created by the leased territory to claim ignorance of 
the law. For instance, the French had instituted a number of export prohibitions in Indochine; 
thus, many goods produced in Indochine that were subsequently imported to China via the leased 
territory were by definition contraband, even if the same goods could be imported legally to 
China if produced elsewhere. 
  Ultimately, the end of Guangzhouwan and its opium trade came only with the collapse of 
Western imperialism in East Asia. Starting in July 1937, a full-scale war raged between Japan 
and China, with the countryside of Guangdong and Guangxi becoming strongholds of Chinese 
resistance. Meanwhile, the fall of France in 1940 placed Guangzhouwan in an administrative 
limbo perhaps more complex than that of any other territory in France’s empire. Following the 
establishment of the Vichy government, a new governor-general for Indochine, Admiral Decoux, 
was appointed with the difficult task of navigating the ongoing Sino-Japanese conflict. Decoux 
was positively disposed toward the Chongqing government of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), 
and even conspired to preserve ties with it in the event that Vichy cut them off (Vichy 
maintained ties with both Chongqing and the Japanese collaborationist government in 
Nanjing).10 He therefore was content to allow supplies to continue flowing to Chongqing, 
prompting the Japanese occupation of Tonkin in September 1940. With nearly all of the ports of 
southern China already under occupation, Guangzhouwan was suddenly the nexus of the most 
convenient route for conveying supplies to Chongqing, a situation only exacerbated with the start 
of the Pacific War and the occupation of Hong Kong in late 1941. Though Guangzhouwan was 
not officially under Japanese military occupation, a small Japanese military contingent—
followed by diplomatic, commercial, and intelligence agents—arrived in the summer of 1940 to 
“guarantee security,” a euphemism for seeking out GMD and CCP supporters among the tide of 
refugees who had arrived since 1937 (Xie 2016, 345).  
The war was a boon to the territory, as the refugee population patronized the local service 
economy, which was built on temporary pleasures and stupefaction. Between the fall of Canton 
in October 1938 and January 1942, the population of Chikan increased from 5,000–6,000 
inhabitants to 80,000, and the entire leased territory saw a tenfold increase in its population (Xie 
2016, 351).11 Guangzhouwan also became a conduit for weapons and currency smuggling, with 
an estimated 400,000 yuan worth of goods being smuggled into China every day (Xie 2016, 346). 
The Japanese contingent stationed in the leased territory quickly ran into difficulties trying to 
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prevent the manufacture and transport of arms, which were most often sent to guerillas on 
Hainan (Vannière 2004, 520). The officials of the Maritime Customs Service, who continued to 
operate from their posts despite the ubiquitous warfare and guerilla activity in the region, were 
also frustrated by the near impossibility of managing the flow of goods in and out of the French-
leased territory. 
In the third week of February 1943, Guangzhouwan was occupied by the Japanese 
military under the terms of a “mutual defense agreement.”12 It was supposed to be jointly run 
with French officials, as was the case in Indochine, but the occupation was also immediately 
presented as a step in returning Guangzhouwan (and other French concessions in China) to 
Chinese sovereignty, an attempt to bolster the legitimacy of the Japanese-collaborationist 
Nanjing government of Wang Jingwei, and the leased territory was nominally placed under the 
administration of Guangdong Province (under Wang’s administration) (“Rijun yijiao” 1943). In 
fact, it was, as always, the opium dealers who managed daily life in Guangzhouwan and used 
smuggling to provide daily necessities to the populace and weapons to Nationalist troops and 
guerillas in the countryside. Tsang Hoc-Tam outwardly worked with the new order, greeting the 
Japanese occupation force alongside the French administrator-in-chief, Pierre-Jean Domec, and 
serving as the head of a number of Japanese-sponsored organizations to provide relief for the 
civilian population. Nevertheless, Tsang also seems to have provided material support to the 
Nationalist war effort, and he had even visited Chongqing to raise funds for warplanes shortly 
before the Japanese occupation of Guangzhouwan (Xie 2016, 349). For their part, the Japanese 
must have been aware of Tsang’s activities, but, like the French, realized that he was 
indispensable as an intermediary with the local population and too powerful to depose. 
On March 9 and 10, 1945, the Japanese orchestrated a coup in Indochine. Guangzhouwan 
followed suit, and what remained of the territory’s French population was imprisoned, 
appropriately, in the vault of the Banque de l’Indochine, the historical storehouse of the 
territory’s opium profits. Following the dropping of the atomic bombs in August, only three days 
after Japanese surrender, a treaty was signed in Chongqing with representatives of Charles de 
Gaulle’s Provisional Republic to return the leased territory to Chinese sovereignty. A tit-for-tat 
arrangement had been set up: de Gaulle would surrender the outpost of empire, one that few 
French citizens even knew the existence of, in exchange for what he hoped would be Chiang’s 
assistance in laying the groundwork for reestablishing French control in Tonkin (Matot 2013, 
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210–212). Chiang’s government transformed the former leased territory into the municipality of 
Zhanjiang, the only enduring remnant of his postwar government’s brief rule on Leizhou. 
Though nominally in control of the entire Leizhou Peninsula for the first time, the Nationalists 
found it no easier to control than the French or Japanese had before them. Banditry and piracy 
remained intractable problems, and easily overlapped with Communist guerrilla movements. 
Most dramatically, in July 1948, hundreds of bandits raided and ransacked the former leased 
territory, carting off the entire cash holdings of the branches of the Central Bank and Bank of 
China before government troops arrived (“Raiders” 1948). Naturally, Tsang Hoc-Tam 
maintained his prominence in local politics despite his apparent collaboration with the Japanese, 
being appointed the chief of a “liberation unit” to prepare for the arrival of Chinese troops. 
Afterward, he led an  “anti-banditry village protection” 清匪保乡 committee, served as the chief 
of the police corps of the new Zhanjiang municipality, and was elected as Zhanjiang’s 
representative to the National Assembly. Ever the survivor, Tsang turned over his interests in 
Zhanjiang to a trusted associate and disappeared before Communist troops closed in, only to 
reemerge later in Hong Kong, where he would spend the remainder of his life (Matot 2013, 211–
212, 221). 
The French venture at Guangzhouwan is generally described as a failed imperial project, 
a comically misguided attempt to match the British in the game of imperialism. Historian Robert 
Lee characterized it as “an absurdly useless coaling station” not far enough from Haiphong to 
warrant its existence (1989, 188). Despite warning signs from as early as 1895, the French 
discovered too late that the strong currents and shallow waters of Guangzhouwan would never 
permit it to become a rival to Hong Kong, and that France had spent its diplomatic capital on “an 
acquisition of negligible strategic or commercial significance” (Lee 1989, 303n56). As with its 
East Asian colonies as a whole, and even more so its concessions in China, a lack of 
commitment by the French public and government must also be factored into any explanation of 
the project’s failure. But Guangzhouwan was in some ways successful; it did little to spread 
French culture or enhance French prestige, but it was one of the most fiscally sustainable 
territories in France’s empire. Furthermore, like the French Concession in Shanghai, it provided 
a space for Chinese entrepreneurs of various stripes to flourish in jurisdictional gray areas. 
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Guangzhouwan was a doubly liminal space: a territory in China that was not under Chinese 
jurisdiction, as well as a secondary zone within broader regional and global networks of trade. 
 
The Early People’s Republic 
 Though the Second World War had ended the dream of a French Hong Kong, it did not 
end the idea that the region could become a hub for trade, an entry point for inland connections 
to western Guangdong and Guangxi, and potentially the home of major military facilities. The 
Japanese, Guomindang, and Communists all imagined that the region could move away from its 
economic reliance on illicit trades and be developed to rival and even supplant the British crown 
colony. After World War II, the Nationalists envisaged the new municipality of Zhanjiang 
becoming a key hub on a rail network that would cut across southern China, as well as the home 
to facilities that could house a deepwater navy capable of enforcing China’s territorial claims, 
two goals that were eventually realized after 1949. The People’s Government also oversaw the 
construction of modern port facilities on the coast of Xiashan (known thereafter as the Port of 
Zhanjiang 湛江港) between 1956 and June 1958. The increase in trade resulting from these 
projects benefitted the local economy but strained the ability of customs officials to monitor 
commercial activity along the porous coastline (“Development” 1947; “Rival Port” 1956; 
“Xiandaihua” 1956).13 
 Social reform was also at the top of the agenda for the new regime. Zhanjiang 
participated in a nationwide campaign against opium that later intensified and overlapped with 
the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and the Three- and Five-Antis Campaigns 
(Zhou 2000, 385, 388). On December 25, 1949, immediately after Zhanjiang was taken by the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the newly created Zhanjiang Municipal Public Security Bureau 
issued an order banning gambling, and the following month set up an anti-drug, anti-gambling 
exhibition in Chikan.14 By the end of 1950, 221 opium dens had been shut down in Zhanjiang 
and over 1,300 liang of opium seized. Throughout western Guangdong, nearly a thousand 
suspected drug traffickers were seized, along with opium in various forms, pipes, needles, gold, 
silver, and thousands of yuan worth of money in various currencies. On August 30, 1952, the 
local Public Security Bureau (PSB) and a local unit of the PLA launched a coordinated strike, 
resulting in the arrest of 137 people and the registration of over 700 opium users (a minority 
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were arrested, while most were sent for re-education or allowed to remain in Zhanjiang under 
surveillance).15 Likewise, houses of prostitution were shut down, rallies were held for prostitutes 
to lament their oppression in the old society, and former prostitutes were sent off to receive 
vocational training and political education.16   
Controls on the movement of people and goods across the frontier went hand in hand 
with social reform. The communities of the Leizhou Peninsula continued to engage in smuggling 
after liberation, much as they had before. Throughout Guangdong, historical trading connections 
with Hong Kong, Macao, and Southeast Asia continued to function into the 1950s, and the Pearl 
River Delta maintained its historical role as the main avenue for trade into the Chinese interior 
(Thai 2017, 8). Therefore, the effort to curtail smuggling was tied to the registration and 
management of people, particularly travelers, traders, and itinerants. In January 1950, the 
Zhanjiang PSB set out its first guidelines for controlling the household registration system in 
advance of establishing the hukou system in June of that year.17 In the summer of 1951, the 
Ministry of Public Security put in place regulations on travel to and from Hong Kong, and both 
terrestrial and maritime travelers were required to register with the authorities. In December 
1952, Zhanjiang coordinated its participation in a nationwide “Urban Democratic Establishment 
Movement” with a local campaign to “eliminate unregistered households” (消灭“黑户口”).18 
Controlling the waters around Zhanjiang was particularly difficult; well into the 1960s, 
individual fishermen or small groups were discovered selling fish outside of official channels, 
exchanging them for consumer goods (watches, radios, etc.) or raw materials and selling them on 
the black market back in Zhanjiang.19 
Nevertheless, in the course of “national reconstruction,” local officials were often willing 
to tolerate and even facilitate the smuggling of goods not related to currency, weapons, or 
narcotics in the first years of the People’s Republic. Top party officials made a similar 
calculation during the Korean War, when the People’s Republic was under a U.S. embargo. 
Similar to the Chongqing government’s reliance on smuggling during the most desperate years 
of the war against Japan, top party officials Zhou Enlai and Bo Yibo encouraged smuggling to 
ensure the supply of essential war materials (Thai 2017, 6). Indeed, the relationship between the 
command economy and the black market (or “second economy”) was symbiotic in the early 
years of the People’s Republic (Thai 2017, 4). But the competing imperative of autarky, as well 
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as the political dangers of permitting—if not encouraging—smuggling, necessitated occasional 
crackdowns. During the Three-Antis Campaign against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism, a 
group of high-level officials in the Zhanjiang Ports Bureau 港務局, Construction Bureau 建設局, 
and PSB were charged in a major corruption scandal (“Zhanjiang zhonggong” 1952). Between 
1956 and 1960, a coordinated anti-smuggling campaign uncovered 429 cases of smuggling in 
Zhanjiang (forty-three of which were classified as “big cases”), hauling in 120,000 yuan worth of 
goods and 145,000 yuan in evaded taxes and fines.20 At the same time, relaxations on movement 
to and from Hong Kong and Macao beginning in February 1956 increased cross-border travel to 
the point that over 4,000 visitors were entering the mainland each day. This increase boosted 
smuggling (40,000 cases were uncovered in Guangdong Province in 1956, a twenty-five-fold 
increase over 1955) and illegal currency exchange markets (set up largely for remittances from 
Hong Kong) that offered a better rate than the official channels (“Xianggang” 1957). 
Wristwatches, metals, and groceries were carried in visitors’ suitcases (easily hidden, if 
necessary, from the overburdened customs officials at the Kowloon Customs Station), and the 
goods soon appeared in street corner markets that proliferated in Canton and throughout 
Guangdong in 1956 and 1957. Of even greater concern were cases of “political smuggling” 
engaged in by capitalist families and other vaguely defined political groups (the rhetoric of the 
People’s Government was that the economic and political motivations for smuggling were 
inseparable, but in practice local officials were usually less doctrinaire) (Thai 2017, 17). In 
response, starting in April 1956, Guangdong Province required applications to be submitted 
before travel to or from Hong Kong and Macao (“Guangdong fanzousi” 1958). But this did little 
to stem the tide of smuggled goods and currency, which decreased only after a strict imposition 
of border controls in November 1957 and a mass political campaign against smuggling from 
December 1957 until February 1958 (“Guangyu” 1958). 
These restrictions on movement and exchange coincided with the first signs of economic 
difficulties caused by collectivization, a tragic confluence of factors that would lead to a surge of 
evasion and outright resistance throughout Guangdong in late 1956 and early 1957. Zhanjiang 
had long been prone to scarcity in the wintertime, but in the mid-1950s, in line with 
collectivization and “natural disasters” created by failed economic policies and poor resource 
management, shortages became a year-round problem. In May 1955, nearly half of the land in 
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Zhanjiang was suffering from drought.21 A November 1956 internal report for high-level cadres 
stated flatly that famine was “extremely severe” in and around Zhanjiang; in Maoming and 
Wuchuan Counties alone, over 200,000 people were completely without food. The food 
shortages led to pervasive migration as hundreds of thousands of peasants in the worst-hit areas 
desperately fled their villages, often to seek industrial work in cities. Moreover, massive 
irrigation projects initiated by the Great Leap Forward resulted in the displacement of hundreds 
of thousands by 1961 (Dikötter 2010, 170). As a result, the Zhanjiang PSB had to modify the 
hukou register to allow for food provision for new urban migrants and refugees.22 Black markets 
for agricultural goods sprang up as farmers who were producing enough food sought to sell it off 
before it was consolidated in the state granaries. The result was that the state granaries’ intake 
was only about a quarter of what had been planned, and desertion from the collectives was 
rampant (Dikötter 2013, 279; “Guangdongsheng” 1956). Akin to similar events across 
Guangdong (and indeed throughout China), “counter-revolutionary groups” sprang up and, 
before being suppressed, raided state granaries, cut electrical wires, stole guns, and killed party 
cadres.23  
Famine conditions continued into 1958 and were bad enough that some starving peasants 
in Zhanjiang resorted to selling their children (Dikötter 2010, 67). Unfortunately, despite such 
clear warning signs, the CCP “doubled down” on collectivization and launched the people’s 
communes. Amid the heady enthusiasm for the Great Leap Forward, party officials, including 
Provincial Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang, insisted in a January 1959 report on Zhanjiang that 
grain production was sufficient, and that shortages were due to hoarding. Cadres who reported 
shortages or expressed concern were denounced as being excessively “conservative” or worse. 
Just as Guangdong was being battered by a furious typhoon, further lowering output, Zhao 
backed a political typhoon in the form of an anti-hoarding campaign. Cadres were not safe from 
criticism in this campaign, and roughly half of the “grassroots”-level cadres in Guangdong faced 
criticism or punishment.24 Such obstinacy in the face of an economic and social crisis largely 
explains a wider eruption of discord, characterized by evasion, black markets, unrest, and 
violence, throughout Guangdong during the Great Famine. Grain production in Zhanjiang fell in 
1958 from the already low 1957 levels (from 660,600 to 649,700 tons), and fell again drastically 
in 1959 (to 501,700 tons).25 Peasants in many parts of Guangdong were left with under 10 jin of 
rice a month, about two-thirds of their already tight rations, and the communal kitchens 
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distributed only the most minimal diet of rice gruel (Yang 2008, 185). By this time, people 
sought to cope with the difficult conditions by engaging in the “three black winds” of theft, 
gambling, and smuggling.26 Even after measures to ameliorate the famine were introduced in 
1961, Zhanjiang continued to face severe famine into 1962, when food production finally began 
to recover (“Guangdong gedi” 1962).  
  
The Cultural Revolution Era 
Smuggling in Zhanjiang appears to have finally decreased in the late 1960s, in tandem 
with the Cultural Revolution, though this is just as likely to be a result of poor record keeping 
and policing due to political upheaval as it is a result of a slowdown in commercial activity. In 
fact, smuggling may have continued despite the intense political environment. It is known that in 
areas of Guangdong near Hong Kong, illegal trade and violations of the planned economy 
occurred at the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1966–1967, and were even guided by local 
party leaders (Chan, Madsen, and Unger 2009, 135–136).27 In Zhanjiang, the end of the most 
radical phase of the Cultural Revolution and the slight relaxation of social and economic controls 
following the death of Lin Biao in 1971 meant a return of smuggling. Fishermen took advantage 
of the opportunity to fish in the Gulf of Tonkin to exchange with Vietnamese fishermen daily 
necessities, medicine, or renminbi for scrap metal or watches. In 1972, a customs investigation of 
coastal communities uncovered smuggling activity in many of the fishing communes in 
Zhanjiang, and over the next three years an anti-smuggling campaign uncovered nearly three 
hundred cases, together worth 351,000 yuan.28 In terms of state-sanctioned trade, the port of 
Zhanjiang was earmarked for a major upgrade in August 1973 as part of a national effort by 
Zhou Enlai to modernize port facilities.29 This was accompanied by new oil exploration facilities 
in the Potou District and a trial program of exporting lightbulbs from factories in Zhanjiang to 
Hong Kong.30 At the same time, however, Zhanjiang was subjected in the final years of Mao’s 
life to a “Party Basic Line Education Movement” launched in 1973 throughout Guangdong as a 
reaction to concerns about cracks in the commune system, the reappearance of capitalism, and 
labor migration.31  
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The Reform Era  
The comprehensive economic reforms instituted starting in the late 1970s provided new 
economic opportunities for the region. In early 1984, Zhanjiang and Beihai were included among 
the first fourteen “National coastal open cities” 沿海开放城市 along with better-known places 
like Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou. This provided the people of the municipality with 
improved economic opportunities, particularly vis-à-vis Hong Kong and Macao, but many of the 
unsavory aspects of the “old society” that were smothered in the 1950s had reappeared by the 
early 1980s. Despite renewed campaigns against smuggling and “spiritual pollution,” the Reform 
Era brought a drastic increase in the number of smuggling cases, though this may have also been 
due to a professionalization of customs officials following the Cultural Revolution. Certainly the 
value of the goods being smuggled increased; instead of raw materials and daily necessities, 
nylon stockings, VCRs, televisions, and even automobiles were now being smuggled to avoid the 
high import duties of the People’s Government. Customs investigations in Zhanjiang turned up 
roughly three thousand cases of smuggling in the first decade of “reform and opening up.” Into 
the late 1980s, the annual number of cases and the value of goods seized continued to increase.32  
Zhanjiang also saw the return of both drug use and trafficking. In 1988, the largest 
smuggling case in the municipality since 1949 was exposed, with 5,662 grams of heroin and 
5,220 grams of opium seized. In the 1990s, more than eleven thousand people were investigated 
for drug-related crimes and seventeen were arrested for trafficking.33 Local and provincial 
authorities launched a sustained campaign against the “six evils” 六害 (prostitution, pornography, 
the sale of women and children, narcotics, gambling, and profiteering from superstition—later 
expanded to “seven evils,” to include secret societies). As in the 1950s, the Reform Era anti-drug 
campaigns have been replete with dramatic but largely ineffective public theatrics and reminders 
of the role of opium in China’s humiliation at the hands of imperialists. More effectively, in 
order to cope with the increase in smuggling and other illegal activities, the Zhanjiang authorities 
greatly expanded the municipality’s border defense units. Focusing on anti-smuggling and anti-
“illegal migration” efforts, in 1990 the Border Defense Bureau could claim, somewhat 
implausibly, to have halted unsanctioned migration while cracking fifty-seven cases of 
smuggling in goods worth more than 2.2 million yuan.34 
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 Whatever successes were achieved, they were undercut by the increasing wealth of the 
mainland economy, which drove demand for smuggled goods and monetary incentives to engage 
in smuggling. The amount of money involved opened the door for widespread bribery and 
corruption. These problems were exposed on September 8, 1998, by the Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the CCP and provincial authorities, when rampant corruption in 
the Zhanjiang local party and municipal government was uncovered. According to a People’s 
Daily article on the case, “Some leading cadres and staff of Zhanjiang Customs, Border Defense, 
and other departments of party and government organs, disregarded party discipline by wantonly 
taking bribes, protecting smugglers, aiding smugglers, and even engaging in smuggling 
themselves” (“Zhanjiang teda” 1999). The core group of smugglers included the chief of customs 
in Zhanjiang, the director of the Zhanjiang Customs Investigation Department, and the chief of 
the Zhanjiang PSB Border Defense Bureau, all of whom received millions of yuan in cash and 
property from smugglers as bribes. Even the vice-mayor and secretary of the Zhanjiang Party 
Committee were implicated. The most active of these officials smuggled more than 3,800 cars, 
190,000 tons of steel, 40,000 tons of diesel, and 10,000 tons of raw sugar. All told, roughly 6.2 
billion yuan in smuggled goods and evaded taxes were involved in the case, which has been 
remembered nationally as one of the most egregious of the entire reform era (“Zhanjiang teda” 
1999). 
 
Conclusion—Zhanjiang and the Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road 
 Following the 1998 scandal, the focused efforts of municipal, prefectural, and provincial 
authorities to fight smuggling have been partially successful, though the reporting of such data 
must always be taken with a grain of salt. The decrease could just as likely be due to better 
means of hiding smuggling, bribery of local officials, reduced barriers to trade, state-sanctioned 
smuggling in small quantities, or a combination of these factors. But an increase in cases during 
China’s boom years, such as a 2006 cigarette smuggling case totaling 50 million yuan in evaded 
taxes and more recent cases involving smuggled airplanes and even an oil barge, suggest that 
smuggling can only be stifled temporarily with the dedication of a great deal of resources.35  
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Figure 5. Cases of smuggling annually in Zhanjiang Municipality, 1998–2014. Source: 
Zhanjiang nianjian 1999–2012; data for 2012–2014 from Zhanjiang Customs.36 
 
 Zhanjiang is set to play a key role in China’s maritime future. The port of Zhanjiang is 
not only a commercial hub but also home to the PLA Navy’s South Sea Fleet. The region stands 
to benefit greatly from increased foreign trade and Xi Jinping’s “21st-Century Maritime Silk 
Road” initiative, as it did from the premodern Maritime Silk Road (“Xi Jinping” 2014). But it is 
worth considering this bright future alongside another of Xi Jinping’s projects, the intense anti-
corruption drive within the CCP. This campaign, which likely accounts for the decrease in 
smuggling cases since 2012 (see figure 5), has already implicated justices of the municipal-level 
court and the deputy director of the Municipal People’s Congress in Zhanjiang, as well as the 
deputy chief justice of the district court, the head of the Social Security Bureau, and the party 
secretary in Potou District in cases involving millions of yuan in bribes.37 Yet it is unlikely that 
Xi’s anti-corruption drive will succeed in fully uprooting corruption, bribery, and smuggling. 
The long history of initiatives to control trade and migration on the Leizhou Peninsula suggests 
that, wherever demand for goods is met with tariffs and regulations, smugglers will find a way to 
evade the state. 
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Notes 
 
1 “Dashiji” 大事記 [Chronicle of major events], in Zhanjiang shi (2004). 
2 For example, in 1931, the population of Guangzhouwan comprised roughly 100 French 
nationals, 600 “Annamites,” and 206,000 Chinese residents.  
3 Thanks to Joel Montague and Angel Xiao for sharing some of their thorough research on 
the voyages of the ship l'Amphitrite in 1698–1702. 
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and law, chapter 1, Public security, section 3, Management of public order II, Drug 
control], in Zhanjiang shi (2004).  
7 Diwu pian gangkou yu kou’an guanli, disi jie haiguan, yi, jiguan yange 第五篇港口與口
岸管理, 第四節海關,一,機構沿革 [Zhanjiang city annals, part 5, Harbor and port 
management, chapter 2, Port management, section 4, Customs, 1. Organizational 
evolution], in Zhanjiang shi (2004).  
8 Ibid.  
9 Guangdong Provincial Archives, Maritime Customs Records (haiguan dang’an). Pakhoi 
95-1/1053 January-1934 / 1934.02.08 and April-1934 / 1934.05.20 - Appendix 2, 
“Smuggling and Preventive Activities in Kwangchowwan”; Pakhoi 95-1/1053 October-
1934 / 1934.11.15 Appendix 1, “Smuggling and Preventive Activities in 
Kwangchowwan”; Pakhoi 95-1/1054 May-1935 / 1935.06.18, “Appendix 1, “Smuggling 
and Preventive Activities in Kwangchowwan.” My thanks to Philip Thai for sharing these 
sources. 
10 Academia Historica 020-040802-0094, Guangzhouwan wenti (yi) 廣州灣問題（一） 
[Documents on the Guangzhouwan issue (1)], Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1943–1946), 
p. 29. 
11 Second Historical Archives of China, Maritime Customs Records Microfilm Collection, 
Pt. III “Semi-official correspondence from selected ports,” Inspectorate General, 
“Luichow Semi Official, 1942,” 679 (1) 32565, Luichow SO) No. 158, January 13, 1942 
(available at http://www.worldcat.org/title/china-and-the-west-the-maritime-customs-
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13 “Dashiji,” in Zhanjiang shi (2004).  
14 “Dashiji,” in Zhanjiang shi (2004).  
15 Di ershiliu pian zhengfa, di yi zhang gong’an, di san jie zhi’an guanli, er – jindu, in 
Zhanjiang shi (2004). 
16 Diershiliu pian zhengfa, diyi zhang gong’an, disan jie, zhi’an guanli 第二十六編 政法,第
一章,公安,第三節,治安管理  [Zhanjiang city annals, part 26, Politics and law, chapter 1, 
Public security, Section 3, Management of public order], in Zhanjiang shi (2004). 
17 Diershiliu pian zhengfa, diyi zhang, gong’an, diwu jie, huzheng he churu jing guanli, 
yi—changzhu hukou guanli, (er) xin Zhongguo chengli hou huzheng guanli 第五節戶政
和出入境管理,一,常住戶口管理,(二) 新中國成立後戶政管 [Zhanjiang city annals, part 
26, Politics and law, chapter 1, Public security, Section 5, Household governance and 
immigration management, 1. Permanent residence management, (2) Household 
management following the establishment of new China], in Zhanjiang shi (2004). 
18 Zhanjiang shi (2004). Diershiliu pian zhengfa, diyi zhang gong’an, diwu jie huzheng he 
churujing guanli, er—churu jing guanli, (yi) laiwang Gang’Ao qianzheng 二,出入境管
理,(一)來往港澳簽證 [Zhanjiang city annals, part 26, Politics and law, chapter 1, Public 
security, Section 5, Household governance and immigration management, 2. Immigration 
management, (1) Visas to/from Hong Kong and Macao]; Zhanjiang shi (2004). In 
February 1955, the regional (Zhongnan) hukou system was merged with the national 
system, and the identity card regime was instituted. Also, “Zhanjiang yanli” (1951).  
19 Di wupian gangkou yu kou’an guanli, di si jie haiguan, si – jisi, zhanjiang haiguan de jisi. 
[Zhanjiang city annals, part 5, Harbor and port management, chapter 2, Port management, 
Section 4, Customs, 4. Anti-smuggling, Zhanjiang customs’ anti-smuggling operations], 
in Zhanjiang shi (2004). 
20 Ibid. 
21 “Dashiji,” in Zhanjiang shi (2004).  
22  Di ershiliu pian zhengfa, diyi zhang gong’an, diwu jie huzheng he churu jing guanli, yi – 
changzhu hukou guanli, (er) xin zhongguo chengli hou huzheng guanli, in Zhanjiang shi 
(2004,).   
23 Nineteen of the fifty-three members of this group were executed; the remainder were 
given long prison sentences. The local gazetteer attributes this event to a heightened 
sense of suspicion during the Anti-Right Deviationist Campaign in Lianjiang, leading to 
many false accusations. Diershiliu pian zhengfa, disan zhang shenpan, dier jie shenpan 
gongzuo, yi—xingshi shenpan, (er) xin Zhongguo chengli hou xingshi shenpan 第三章審
判,第二節審判工作,一,刑事審判,(二)新中國成立後刑事審判  [Zhanjiang city annals, 
part 26, Politics and law, chapter 3, Trials, section 2, Trial work, 1. Criminal trials, (2) 
Criminal trials after the founding of new China], in Zhanjiang shi (2004). 
24 “Leinan xian de jingyan zhengming, muqian nongcun you daliang liangshi, liangshi 
jinzhang wanquan shi jiaxiang, shi shengchandui he fendui jinxing manchan sifen 
zaocheng de” (Guangdong weishuji chushuji Zhao Ziyang, Leinan xian [Xuwen xian] 
ganbu dahui jiejue liangshi wenti de baogao) “雷南縣的經驗證明,目前農村有大量糧食,
糧食緊張完全是假象,是生產隊和分隊進行瞞產私分造成的” (廣東委書記處書記趙
紫陽,雷南縣[徐聞縣]幹部大會解決糧食問題的報告) [“The experience in Leinan 
 Pieragastini  135 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 25 (December 2017) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-25) 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
County shows that villages currently have large quantities of grain, the grain emergency 
is completely illusory, and was due to production teams and constituent units concealing 
produce and private hoarding” (Guangdong Party Committee Secretariat, Secretary Zhao 
Ziyang, Report to the Leinan County [Xuwen County] Cadres Assembly to Solve Grain 
Problems)], quoted in Yang (2008, 431).  
25 Dishier pian nongye, diyi zhang nongye fazhan gaishu 第十二篇農業,第一章農業發展
概述 [Zhanjiang city annals, section 12, Agriculture, chapter 1, Overview of agricultural 
development], in Zhanjiang shi (2004). If anything, these published official statistics 
underestimate the severity of the crisis. 
26 Diershiliu pian zhengfa, diyi zhang, gong’an, dier jie daji gezhong fanzui huodong, si, 
daji xingshi fanzui huodong 第二節 打擊各種犯罪活動四,打擊刑事犯罪活動 
[Zhanjiang city annals, part 26, Politics and law, chapter 1 Public Security, section 2, 
Combat all kinds of criminal activity, 4. Fight against criminal activity], in Zhanjiang shi 
(2004). 
27 Diwu pian gangkou yu kou’an guanli, disi jie haiguan, san zhengshou guanshui, (er) 
zhanjiang haiguan de zhengshui 三,徵收關稅,(二)湛江海關的徵稅 [Zhanjiang city 
annals, part 5, Harbor and port management, chapter 2, Port management, section 4, 
Customs, 3. Levying customs duties, (2) Zhanjiang customs service levying of duties], in 
Zhanjiang shi (2004). 
28 Diwu pian gangkou yu kou’an guanli, disi jie haiguan, si jisi, Zhanjiang haiguan de jisi 
四,緝私,湛江海關的緝私 [Zhanjiang city annals, part 5, Harbor and port management, 
chapter 2, Port management, section 4, customs, 4. Anti-smuggling, Zhanjiang Customs’ 
anti-smuggling operations], in Zhanjiang shi (2004). 
29 Soon afterward, the Zhanjiang Customs Office was separated from the Foreign Trade 
Bureau (Waimaoju) and made into an independent office. 
30 In the 1920s, both Standard Oil and the Asiatic Petroleum Company had operations in 
Guangzhouwan. 
31 “Dashiji,” in Zhanjiang shi (2004); Di shi’er pian nongye, di yi zhang nongye fazhan 
gaishu, in Zhanjiang shi (2004). 
32 Di wupian gangkou yu kou’an guanli, di si jie haiguan, si jisi, zhanjiang haiguan de jisi, 
in Zhanjiang shi (2004). 
33 Di ershiliu pian zhengfa, di yi zhang gong’an, di san jie zhi’an guanli, in Zhanjiang shi 
(2004). 
34 Diershiliu pian zhengfa, diyi zhang, gong’an, disi jie bianfang baowei 第四節,邊防保衛  
[Zhanjiang city annals, part 26, Politics and law, chapter 1, Public security, section 4, 
Border defense], in Zhanjiang shi (2004). 
35 Years when smuggling cases are lower coincide with provincial and national anti-
smuggling campaigns, such as in 2010, when the prefecture implemented the “Four 
Withouts, Five Haves” (siwu wuyou) policy and named Zhanjiang a “smuggling-free city” 
(wuzousi shi) ( “China Customs cracks”; “‘Chunlei xingdong’”; Zhanjiang nianjian…). 
36 The data is most often listed under fazhi, daji gezhong fanzui huodong (section on “Rule 
of Law,” subsection on “Combatting All Kinds of Criminal Activity”), but in some years 
appears under kou’an (section on “Harbors”) or jingji (section on “Economics”). All 
yearbooks are compiled by the Zhanjiang Yearbook Compilation Committee (Zhanjiang 
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nianjian bianzuan weiyuanhui) and published by People’s Daily Publishing House 
(Renmin Ribao Chubanshe); they are available at http://zjs.gd-
info.gov.cn/shtml/zjs/lanmu04/zjnj/, accessed May 17, 2015. For 2012–2014 data, see 
“Zhanjiang haiguan qunian” (2015) and “Zhanjiang haiguan 2013 nian (2014).  
37 Data and information retrieved from the South China Morning Post database, “Tigers and  
Flies: How two years of graft probes have shaken China's political elite” 
(http://multimedia.scmp.com/china-corruption/), accessed May 17, 2015. 
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